Kidneys Save Lives: Markets Would Probably Help by Semrau, Luke
PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY 
Volume 28, Number 1, January 2014 
KIDNEYS SAVE LIVES: 
MARKETS WOULD PROBABLY HELP 
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The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 prohibited the exchange of hu-man organs for "valuable consideration" and so effectively banned kidney 
markets. 1 This legislation was motivated by political, cultural, and religious 
resistance to the idea of commodifying the human body, worries about donors' 
safety, and a range of other ethical concerns. At the time, the prohibition had few 
drawbacks: the frequency of transplantation was low, and there was optimism 
about our ability to secure a sufficient number of healthy organs through donation. 
Much has changed in the last thirty years. As anti-rejection drugs have im-
proved, the number of patients who would substantially benefit from a medically 
justifiable transplant has increased dramatically. It has also become evident that 
our exclusive reliance on donation is insufficient to meet the demand; as of No-
vember 2012, according to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network 
(OPTN), the waiting list for a kidney, in the United States alone, includes over 
90,000 people. 2 Consequently, the number of deaths that could be prevented 
by an increase in the supply of kidneys is far greater than it once was. Further, 
developments in surgical technique have made nephrectomies less invasive, and 
mounting evidence suggests that donors' long-term health outcomes are largely 
unaffected by their gift? 
There is a rather straightforward argument, based on the value of human life, for 
the conclusion that organ sales, under certain circumstances, ought to be permitted. 
The argument is as follows: (1) Many people are suffering and dying for lack of 
a healthy kidney; (2) this death and suffering is bad; (3) if we can act to address 
this problem without bringing about a comparable or worse harm, we should;4 
and ( 4) a carefully regulated market would increase the supply of transplantable 
kidneys, thus reducing the death and suffering caused by the current shortage. 
(5) We have compelling reason to think that such a market can be arranged so as 
to secure this increase in supply without causing comparable or worse harm; (c) 
therefore, we should establish a carefully regulated market. I will call this the 
"value of life argument." 
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Before delving into this argument, it is worth immediately clarifying how the 
value of life argument differs from the pro-market argument offered by James Stacey 
Taylor in his 2005 book, Stakes and Kidneys. In making his case for a market in hu-
man body parts, Taylor has relied heavily on a substantive conception of autonomy 
that he has developed and refined.5 However, while autonomy continues to play a 
significant role in medical ethics, there is still much disagreement about what the 
proper account of autonomy is, and how that value should feature in medical ethics 
more generally. 6 Rather than relying on a controversial value like autonomy, the 
argument on offer here takes as its lynchpin a far less contentious value, namely, 
the value of life. For this reason, I hope it is met with less resistance. 
There is a second, related way in which the value of life argument deviates 
from Taylor's. As a result of emphasizing autonomy, Taylor's position recom-
mends "a competitive market for the distribution of transplant kidneys."7 That 
is to say, if one accepts the conception of autonomy Taylor defends, then, he 
argues, one should also accept that the market ought to operate both to procure 
and to distribute kidneys for transplant. The value of life argument, in contrast, 
recommends employment of a monopsonistic market in which the government, 
or some other suitable agency, is the sole purchaser of kidneys. On this scheme, 
the market plays no role in distribution. 
Given the variety and complexity of the issues involved, a full defense of the 
value oflife argument is not possible here. My more limited ambition is to show 
that a kidney market, properly regulated, can improve the lives of both recipients 
and donors. I begin by arguing that variations on the current means of organ 
procurement are inadequate for three reasons: living kidney transplants, which 
are likely to be increased only through market mechanisms, are healthier than 
cadaveric kidneys; non-market solutions are unlikely to meet the real demand 
for kidneys; and vendors stand to benefit from participating in a market. 
Next, in the second section, I distinguish between two kinds of objections 
to kidney markets: those that depend for their force on the likelihood of actual 
markets operating imperfectly, which I'll call "real-world" objections, and 
those that would undermine the use of markets even under ideal conditions, or 
"ideal condition" objections. One important reason to attend to this later class 
of objections is that if successful, they would render disputes about "real-world" 
objections superfluous. 
In the third section, I consider an objection that challenges premise (5) of 
the value of life argument by claiming that a kidney market would violate the 
"Do No Harm" principle, which is central to medical ethics. Arthur Caplan, 
a prominent New York University bioethicist, offers this line of resistance. 
Caplan's objection is worth attention, as he has significant influence both in 
academic discussion of this matter and in the public square. Further, Caplan's 
objection demonstrates a conceptual confusion that is common in work on the 
permissibility of kidney markets. 
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In the fourth section, I present and respond to the claim that a market will 
actually decrease the supply of kidneys, which challenges premise ( 4 ). This is an 
important line of resistance for two reasons: First, the claim that a market would 
decrease the supply of kidneys, if correct, would represent an obvious challenge 
to the value of life argument. Second, the claim that a market would decrease 
supply remains common throughout the biomedical literature.8 Additionally, 
Stanford philosopher Debra Satz has recently explored this line of reasoning and 
concluded that it is a source of uncertainty for arguments that rely on the market 
to increase the supply of transplantable kidneys.9 
Then, in the fifth section, I consider Satz's claim that even if an individual may 
suffer no harm in selling her kidney, the practice, when permitted on a large scale, 
may result in harm to those who would rather not participate in the market. 10 If 
true, this would undermine premise (5). Satz's line of resistance offers a unique 
challenge. Typically, arguments to the effect that a market would result in harm 
focus on the participants; but Satz makes a compelling case for the conclusion 
that those who do not participate will be harmed. This objection merits careful 
treatment because it represents a serious challenge to the value of life argument 
and has received little attention in the literature. 
I. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR A MARKET 
Many opposed to markets advocate incremental adjustments to our current 
approach to procuring organs. These general adjustments include improving 
communication about donation through public education and marketing; facilitat-
ing living individuals' choices to donate; facilitating family's choices to donate 
their deceased loved one's kidneys; and expanding the criteria for suitable donor 
organs.'' There are more specific proposals as well: Some have devised ways of 
overcoming problems of blood type incompatibility; 12 others have developed 
methods of transplant that mitigate other concerns about incompatibility; 13 there 
is increasing acceptance of non-directed donation; 14 and "paired kidney exchange" 
offers a further means of facilitating transplants between those who would other-
wise be incompatible. 15 Economist David Kaserman has argued that we may be 
able to meet the current demand if we pursue, successfully, the measures men-
tioned above, achieve a 100 percent cadaveric kidney donation rate, and become 
willing to accept kidneys from "marginal" donors: those with non-ideal health. 16 
Addressing the problem through incremental change, however, is inadequate. 
There are three reasons why, even when assuming Kaserman's most optimistic 
forecast is accurate, the market proposal remains motivated. One reason is that 
kidneys from living donors are of better quality than those from deceased donors, 
and function for nearly twice as long. 17 Thus, even if we were able to supply 
enough cadaveric organs to meet demand, we would still have cause to explore 
market solutions: Recipients have legitimate reasons to prefer live organs, and 
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the market is the only proposal that has the potential of significantly increasing 
the number of live transplants. 
The second reason is that the optimistic projection suggesting that current 
demand can be met is based on the number of people on the waiting list. But this 
is not a wholly reliable indicator of demand, as it does not represent all of those 
who would medically benefit from a transplant. Research suggests that many 
populations, especially minorities, non-English speakers, and the poorly educated 
face barriers to accessing the waiting list. 18 Further, many who would substantially 
benefit from an organ are, by current measures, not permitted access to the list; 
it was estimated that in 2008 almost 135,000 people sufficiently healthy to be 
expected to live at least five more years were never entered on a waiting list. 19 In 
light of these facts, we have good reason to believe that many more people would 
benefit medically from a transplant than the waiting list suggests. 
The third reason to pursue a market solution to the problem presented by the 
shortage of transplantable kidneys has to do with the potential benefits accruing 
to vendors. It has been estimated that a transplant from a single living unrelated 
donor saves over $94,000 (US dollars, 2002) relative to the cost of dialysis. 20 In 
2012 dollars, this is close to $120,000. This total savings per kidney increases 
to close to $250,000 (close to $320,000 in 2012 dollars) when the expected in-
crease in quality adjusted life years is taken into account. There are many ways 
these funds could be distributed to vendors, apart from simply offering a lump 
sum payment. Vendors might receive health insurance, funds for education, or an 
annuity. While more work must be done to determine the optimal compensation 
package, we can reasonably assume that there is likely to be some benefit to those 
who participate as vendors. 21 
Every means of increasing the supply of transplantable kidneys should be 
explored, as every additional kidney can save a life. However, the considerations 
presented above give us reason to prefer a well-regulated monopsonistic market to 
incremental adjustments to the current procurement system. In summary, the live 
kidneys a market could produce are healthier, and so will lead to fewer surger-
ies and better health outcomes; it is unlikely that non-market solutions will ever 
meet the real demand for transplantable kidneys; and, finally, there is reason to 
think that vendors, and not just recipients, will benefit from participating in the 
market. Thus, we should pursue a market solution to the problem presented by 
the shortage of organs. 
2. Two DISTINCT CHALLENGES TO MARKET PROPOSALS 
The value of life argument defended here depends on both empirical facts and 
normative claims, and each premise has been subject to a great deal of criticism. 
Some of the more common objections challenge premise (5), and claim that such 
a market would inevitably involve exploitation of the poor;22 harm to donors;23 
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coercion through ignorance or poverty;24 an erosion of trust in the medical es-
tablishment;25 exacerbation of social inequality;26 and an expansion of the black 
market.27 These objections focus primarily on the possible consequences of a 
kidney market operating in non-ideal conditions. 
Much has been done to rebuff these "real-world' objections. For example, 
Taylor argues that exploitation would not be a problem in a properly regulated 
market and that fears of an expansion in black market-type exchanges are un-
convincing;28 Michele Goodwin argues that social inequality, especially among 
African Americans, would actually be reduced by the introduction of a market;29 
and Benjamin Hippen argues, based on a comprehensive study of Iran's kidney 
market, that harm to donors can be minimized through extensive follow-up care 
for and ongoing attention to patient outcomes.30 
While many of these responses are compelling, the paucity of relevant and reli-
able empirical evidence leaves room for uncertainty. To be sure, there has been a 
great deal of research into markets, both regulated and unregulated, in places like 
Iran, India, and the PhilippinesY However, given the vast differences in economic 
development, medical resources, and sociopolitical climate, one can draw from 
these cases few conclusions about a market in the United States. Further, there are 
many importantly different ways one might arrange a market, and these differences 
will have a significant impact on donors' and recipients' outcomes. 
Many market advocates are sensitive to the current limits of our knowledge. 
Benjamin Hippen, for example, is careful to stress the dangers of extrapolating 
too much from the data we have on Iran's market experience to the operation of 
a market in the United States. And his response to the inadequacy of available 
data is entirely appropriate: "While the lack of accurate data justifies concern, it 
does not justify abandoning the idea of organ vending. The solution is to care-
fully monitor outcomes and adjust the vending system or, if need be, abandon 
it should results prove unacceptable."32 Although there is much more to be said 
about real-world objections, and the pro-market rejoinders that have already 
been offered, one thing seems clear: many of these disputes cannot be decisively 
resolved without data obtainable only through experimentation with markets. 
However, market opponents are likely to resist experimental trials of kidney 
markets. There are two forms this resistance might take. First, market opponents 
may offer "real-world" objections like those just considered. The cogency of 
these lines of resistance will depend in part on what our best empirical evidence 
suggests about the likely consequences of introducing a market. And, as long as 
this kind of empirical evidence is relevant to determining the permissibility of a 
kidney market, market opponents will have to supply reasons for resisting even 
small-scale trials. A second way one might resist experimental trials is to argue 
that even in ideal conditions, a kidney market would be objectionable. This form 
of resistance is, in at least one respect, more troubling than that which takes the 
form of "real-world" objections. For, if one denies that markets are permissible 
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even in ideal conditions, then experimental trials are worse than otiose: they are 
immoral. My central concern in what follows is to develop and refute what I take 
to be the three most compelling "ideal condition" objections. 
3· WOULD A MARKET VIOLATE MEDICAL ETHICS? 
Arthur Caplan argues that a market would violate an important tenet of medical 
ethics, namely, the "Do No Harm" principle, and so should be prohibited. One 
obvious reason to respond to this challenge is that, if true, Caplan's claim would 
undermine premise (5) of the value oflife argument. But there is a second reason: 
Caplan's objection, I will argue, depends on a failure to distinguish between the 
motive on which a person acts and the act performed. Clarifying this distinction 
will help when evaluating the objection presented in the next section. 
Caplan argues that a market in kidneys would be, in principle, unethical. 33 To be 
as charitable as possible to Caplan, I quote extensively from a passage containing 
a full expression of his argument: 
Medicine has long held that the core ethical norm of the profession is the 
principle 'Do no Harm'. Taking organs from living persons is in direct viola-
tion of this moral norm. The only way in which it seems morally defensible 
to remove an organ from someone is on the grounds that the donor chooses 
to undergo the harm solely to help another and that there is sufficient medical 
benefit to the recipient. 
The creation of a market puts medicine in the position of removing body 
parts from persons solely to abet their interest in securing compensation for 
themselves .... A key moral problem with markets in kidneys and other body 
parts is what it does to the ethics of the medical profession. In a market, even 
a regulated one, doctors use their skills to help people harm themselves for 
money and solely for money.34 
If we accept Thomas Nagel's understanding of altruism as "any behavior moti-
vated merely by the belief that someone else will benefit or avoid harm by it,"35 
then the first condition on which Caplan insists, namely, that the choice to give is 
made "solely to help another," appears to be a requirement of altruism. The second 
condition is that there is "sufficient medical benefit." It is only because donation 
meets these two conditions, and so overcomes the "Do No Harm" principle, that 
it is permissible. It would be perfectly acceptable, for example, for a mother to 
donate her kidney to her ailing son; her choice meets both conditions. 
Caplan's objection is predicated on the false assumption that the distinction 
between the acts of giving and selling corresponds to the distinction between 
motives of altruism and selfishness. That is, Caplan assumes that uncompensated 
donors always act altruistically and compensated vendors always act selfishly. 
This is mistaken. We can easily modify the above scenario such that the mother's 
child is not suffering from renal failure, but instead has been diagnosed with 
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leukemia. Her kidney is unlikely to send her son's cancer into remission, but the 
proceeds from its sale might afford him a badly needed course of chemotherapy. 36 
In this case, both of Caplan's criteria are met: the mother is acting "solely to help 
another" and "there is sufficient medical benefit." Clearly, then, a commercial 
exchange can be conducted for altruistic purposes consistent with the "Do No 
Harm" principle. It should be obvious that more ordinary expenditures, for things 
like health care, education, and housing, when purchased by a parent for a child, 
are similarly altruistic, and so provide a suitable basis to motivate sales. 
Further, unpaid donation, which is typically thought to be undertaken "solely 
to help another," may be motivated by selfish purposes. Just as someone might, 
for example, present herself as having certain religious commitments in order to 
win the good favor of a wealthy relative, one might also agree to a superficially 
altruistic donation in hopes of securing favorable treatment. An elderly grandpar-
ent may be more likely to leave you a substantial sum in her will if you donate a 
kidney to your uncle. There are other motives as well; prospective non-directed 
donors have admitted that they were motivated to donate by a desire to make a 
statement against their familyY 
Caplan takes the "Do No Harm" principle to require that donors act on purely 
altruistic motives. However, even if this were a legitimate requirement, it would 
not justify a prohibition on the market; payment is consistent with altruism, and 
so is also consistent with Caplan's reading of the principle. Having disentangled 
the donating/selling distinction from the altruistic/selfish distinction, it is clear 
that the "Do No Harm" principle does not preclude a market. 
4· WOULD A MARKET REDUCE 
THE SUPPLY OF KIDNEYS? 
In his oft-cited The Gift Relationship, Richard Titmuss argued that "the commer-
cialization of blood and donor relationships represses the expression of altruism 
[and] erodes the sense of community."38 Titmuss 's work has frequently been cited 
by market opponents who offer it as evidence for the claim that a market will 
erode altruism and, in doing so, reduce the supply of kidneys. Sheila Rothman and 
David Rothman offer a typical expression of the worry: "[I]ntroducing financial 
incentives might undermine the system, discourage donation, and reduce supply."39 
Corroborating Titmuss's position, much work has been done in motivational 
crowding theory to show that extrinsic incentives or disincentives can suppress 
intrinsic motivation. Behavioral economists Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini have 
found that instituting a penalty for a particular behavior can actually increase its 
frequency. Having observed regular rates of late pickups at ten daycare centers 
in Israel, a modest fine was levied on tardy parents at six centers. Within a week, 
the incidence of late pickups increased substantially at the centers that imple-
mented the fine. Further, when the fine scheme was later rescinded, incidence of 
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late pickups remained close to what it became after the fine was instituted.40 The 
authors' titular hypothesis was that "a fine is a price." The introduction of the 
fine altered the exchange from one subject to social norms of right and wrong, 
to one governed by market norms, wherein one can purchase the privilege of 
leaving their children late at the center. The introduction of the fine changed the 
character of the exchange, and so changed the norms governing it. 
Similarly, a 1997 study lends further support to the claim that the introduction 
of extrinsic incentives can effectively destroy intrinsic motivation and, in doing so, 
reduce the effectiveness of price mechanisms.41 Having informed Swiss residents 
of the liabilities of locating a new nuclear waste site near their homes, researchers 
surveyed their willingness to host the site. Initially, just over 50 percent favored 
locating the site in their neighborhoods. However, when another offer was made, 
this time including a financial award, the number willing to host the site dropped 
to close to 25 percent. Even when the financial incentive was later significantly 
increased, all but one of the nearly three hundred respondents remained opposed to 
the site. The authors explain this shift in support by positing that the introduction 
of financial incentives reduced the "civic spirit" of those supporters of nuclear 
energy who would have otherwise been willing to host the site. Their intrinsic 
motivation was crowded out by the extrinsic incentive. 
Debra Satz notes that the markets studied in motivational crowding theory 
are significantly different from markets in human kidneys, as they "involve 
questions of life and death, not simply convenience, and so it may well be 
that different motivations are invoked in those performing altruistic actions."42 
Satz is right to attend carefully to the ways in which the markets studied in the 
literature on motivational crowding theory are importantly different from the 
market under examination here. But I think she draws the wrong conclusion 
from this difference when she goes on to suggest that these "motivations are 
more likely to be vulnerable to crowding out."43 In the remainder of this section, 
by examining the motives of the different classes of donors, I hope to show that 
we have little reason to expect the net supply of kidneys to decrease with the 
introduction of a market. 
Research has found that among those non-directed donors deemed psychologi-
cally suitable to donate, the most common motives were as follows: 58 percent of 
participants acted on the desire to act in a way "consistent with [their] spiritual 
belief system"; 48 percent sought to "substantially improve the quality of another's 
life at an acceptable personal cost"; 43 percent sought to act in a way "consistent 
with a spirit of altruism."44 Given that these donors are motivated largely by altru-
ism, they seem most susceptible to motivational crowding out.45 Whereas under 
the current arrangement, donors are immediately and unambiguously identified 
as altruistic, the introduction of market elements may weaken this association. 
The worry then is that the altruistic potency of the act may be diluted when some 
donors are vendors. 
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There are two points market advocates can offer in response to this worry. First, 
this class of donors is incredibly small: Based on OPTN data from several years 
ago, there were just over a total of 1,100 non-directed donations completed in the 
United States by the end of 2011.46 So even if all potential non-directed donors 
elect not to donate, the loss may be easily outweighed by the increase in supply 
delivered by those acting on extrinsic incentives.47 
Second, there is reason to doubt that this class will shrink. Some would-be 
uncompensated donors may become compensated donors when the selling price is 
right.48 These donors would be like the Swiss resident who would have permitted 
toxic waste to be stored near her home out of a concern for civic duty, but would 
also allow it for a high-enough price. Additionally, a market could allow for un-
compensated donation, and even enhance it. Peter Singer, in a 2006 article in The 
New York Times, mentions Zell Kravinsky, who, after having donated nearly $45 
million to charity, donated his kidney to a stranger.49 If given the opportunity, Zell, 
or someone like him, may have opted to sell his kidney and donate the proceeds 
to charity. 
The real threat of crowding out comes from directed donors, who contribute 
significantly to the supply of kidneys. According to OPTN data accessed in No-
vember of 2012, annually, directed donations comprise about 30 percent to 40 
percent of all transplants, and more than 99 percent of all live donations.50 If we 
had reason to believe that this class of donors would shrink with the introduction 
of a market, then we would have to also have reason to think that the loss would 
be compensated for. Our best evidence suggests that, while there may be some 
donors displaced by vendors, there will be no decrease in net supply. 
Consider the varied forces at work in a directed donation. The OPTN data 
from November 2012 indicates that almost 90 percent are either genetically or 
legally related, for example, as the spouse, sibling, parent, or child of the recipi-
ent. Typically, such donors are principally concerned about the well-being of 
their loved one. Some also act out of a sense of familial obligation. There are 
other motives, too, that are ethically problematic. Some donors are motivated to 
restore the health of the family member with a significant and important income; 
this financial pressure could be a non-trivial factor in one's decision that may 
be regarded as inappropriate. Other directed donors may want to avoid the guilt 
of choosing not to donate. Further, as Nancy Scheper-Hughes has pointed out, 
there appears to be a significant difference in donation rates by sex;51 According 
to OPTN, to date, roughly 66,000 women have donated, while only 47,000 men 
have. This may be the product of undue societal or familial pressure. 
The strength and variety of motives on which many directed donors act suggests 
that the choice to donate is often over-determined. Such donors may be acting 
on a number of motives, any one of which alone may be sufficient. So, whereas 
the motive of altruism may be necessary for moving non-directed donors to act, 
potential donors concerned about a loved one, compelled by familial obligations, 
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or hoping to restore to health an important breadwinner, will still have ample 
reason to donate in the absence of the altruistic motive. 52 
In discussion of Caplan's objection, I emphasized the need to differentiate 
between the act performed and the motive acted on. Worries about market incen-
tives crowding out altruism and leading to a reduction in supply are the result of a 
similar kind of error. I am suggesting, without intending to impugn the generosity 
of directed donors, that many directed donations are not significantly motivated 
by altruism. They are not moved to donate "merely by the belief that someone 
else will benefit or avoid harm by it."53 Altruism may be one of many motives on 
which they act, but it may not be sufficiently strong on its own, and there may 
be many other sufficiently strong non-altruistic motives. The critical point is that 
there is a structural difference in the ways the two classes confront the choice to 
donate. Directed donors do not begin with the desire to act altruistically and then 
come to see donation as an opportunity for that; they are presented with a loved 
one in need and, in helping that person, engage in an act we describe as altruistic. 
While we might call such an act altruistic, it would be a mistake to think that it is 
this feature of the act that explains why it was undertaken. It is but one, relatively 
small, part of that explanation. 
Having offered some rather general reasons to doubt that market incentives 
will reduce the supply of kidneys, I tum now to a slightly different concern. 
Some market opponents have pointed to certain kinds of cases in which, they 
claim, the market supply of kidneys will lead to a reduction in donations, and so 
a reduction in supply. 54 These cases involve individuals' motivations, but do not 
rely on any substantive claims about altruism. In each case, I argue, any reduction 
in the number of kidneys donated will be balanced by an increase in the number 
of kidneys secured through vending. 
The Recipient's Preference case: Currently, many recipients may only reluc-
tantly allow their loved ones to donate. Parents, for example, are often resistant to 
permitting their children to incur the risks associated with surgery. If a commercial 
alternative were available that would allow, for example, Susan, a concerned 
mother, to receive a kidney from an unrelated source rather than from her son 
Jake, then some would pursue this kind of option. 
Notice, however, that this possibility does not support the conclusion that 
there will be a net reduction in organs available. There are two relevant elements 
to consider: the existence of a market and the recipient's willingness to accept 
a kidney from the potential donor. There are four conditions then, taking Susan 
and Jake's case: 
(1) Susan will not accept Jake's kidney, and there's no market option. 
(2) Susan will not accept Jake's kidney, and there is a market option. 
(3) Susan will accept Jake's kidney, and there's no market option, 
so Jake donates. 
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(4) Susan would accept Jake's kidney, but there is a market option, 
so Jake doesn't donate. 
In the first two conditions, Susan is, out of a concern for Jake's health, unwilling 
to take his kidney. The existence of the market is irrelevant in her decision to reject 
his offer. Opponents of the market point to the difference between the second pair 
of conditions as supporting their objection that a market will lead to a net reduc-
tion in supply. Without the market Jake would have donated, but with it, he won't. 
This line of reasoning, however, shows only that there may be a reduction of 
directed donations, not that there will be a reduction in net supply. In condition 
(4), Jake refrains only because the market has made more kidneys available. If 
the market has not increased supply, then, effectively, condition ( 4) collapses into 
condition (3). So the only circumstances in which a directed donor would have 
given, but elects not to do so on the basis of the recipient's preference, are those 
in which someone else has donated. The result is displacement, not reduction. 
The Donor's Preference case: It is plausible that some potential directed donors 
may choose not to become actual donors if a market can supply a kidney for their 
loved one instead. But, again, this possibility does not support the claim that there 
will be a net decrease in supply. It only shows that some people will refrain from 
donating when someone else can donate instead. 
To suggest that a market could result in a net decrease in available organs on 
account of directed donors' preferences requires attributing to potential donors a 
rather implausible set of motives. For this reduction to materialize, we have to sup-
pose these potential directed donors would have donated in the absence of a market, 
but would rather watch the would-have-been recipient suffer without a functioning 
organ, than give freely alongside vendors. It is hard to see how, and no evidence 
has been provided to suggest that, any donor, let alone an appreciable number of 
donors, operates with these preferences. Rather, most perspective-directed donors 
are strongly motivated to help the recipient, and will do so at great cost. 55 
The Reduced Pressure case: If more kidneys were available, then some reluctant 
potential donors-those who would prefer not to donate but feel unable to refuse 
due to familial or financial pressure-may choose not to. One would expect this 
kind of pressure to decrease if there were available an alternative means of secur-
ing a healthy organ. One might then worry that this will result in fewer donations. 
As was the case in the previous two examples, any donations lost by the "re-
duced pressure" mechanism are really just displaced by kidneys from the market. 
The only way someone who would have donated will refrain from doing so is if 
the market actually reduces pressure to give. But this only happens if the market 
functions as designed and increases supply. If the market does not, then these 
donors once again face the same pressure to donate that they would have faced 
if the market did not exist. 
Further, the reduced pressure case actually illustrates one of the virtues of the 
market. Whereas, under the status quo, many family members are compelled to 
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give, the market, if it functions as expected and increases supply, would afford 
these people an alternative. Rather then being thought of as the only one who 
can help, and feeling the pressure that is likely to come from being in that posi-
tion, the market presents another option. We might then expect a reduction in the 
number of donations that result from ethically worrisome coercive forces. 
I have argued that the introduction of a market will not result in fewer living 
kidney donors. However, market opponents might modify their challenge. Rather 
than pointing to a reduction in living donation, they could claim that the market 
will lead to a reduction in cadaveric donation. The first concern is that a market 
might crowd out the altruistic cadaveric kidney donors, resulting in a net decrease 
in supply. The second concern is even more serious; a market in kidneys may 
change people's attitudes about organ donation in general, and this could result 
in a shortage of hearts, lungs, livers, and other vital organs. This would bring 
about a harm that very well may exceed the benefit of a kidney market, and so 
clearly challenges the value of life argument. 
There are two reasons to think that this grim possibility is remote. First, there is 
a lack of theoretical evidence supporting it. It is not at all clear that motivational 
crowding theory is an appropriate model for deceased donation. The support for 
motivational crowding theory reviewed here involves the comparison of the same 
agent's motivation for the same behavior, with and without extrinsic disincen-
tives or incentives. But the concern about deceased donation alongside a market 
involves one agent's willingness to donate freely after death, and other agents' 
willingness to donate with compensation while living. There are two different 
acts, performed by two different agents. So, motivational crowding theory cannot 
provide theoretical support for the objection that a market in living kidneys will 
result in a decrease in cadaveric donations. 
There is a second reason, based in historical precedent, to doubt that deceased 
donation will decrease. The government-sanctioned kidney market in Iran suffers 
many problems, and is in many important ways different from any market that 
might be established in the United States. However, it is worth noting that deceased 
donation in Iran has actually increased since the market was introduced in 1988.56 
Deceased donation was not practically or culturally feasible before 2000, when 
organs from deceased donors represented only 1.8 percent of the total. 57 After 
legislation in 2000 removed many barriers to deceased donation, rates increased 
to 10% in 2005.58 Given the differences between the United States and Iran, this 
evidence does not ensure that rates of deceased donation will rise here, or even 
remain constant. It does, however, militate against the assertion that markets are 
likely to lead to decreased deceased donation. 
Our best evidence suggests that, while it is possible that the number of non-
directed donors may shrink, on balance we should expect a net increase in supply. 
Some non-directed donors may take advantage of the chance to increase the value 
of their gift by giving away their kidney and the proceeds from its sale. Many 
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who never would have given will become vendors. And those with a loved one 
in need of a transplant will still be motivated to give if the market is unable to 
meet the demand. 
5· WOULD A MARKET OBJECTIONABLY PENALIZE 
THOSE WHO Do NoT PARTICIPATE? 
The objection I tum to now, offered by Debra Satz, challenges the value of life 
argument by identifying some detrimental effects the market may have on those 
who would rather not participate in it. If a kidney market can be shown to have 
these harmful effects, and these effects are significant, then the fifth premise of 
the value of life argument would be rendered false. 
To see the source of harm that Satz is concerned about, we need to first consider 
how individuals' choices impact the choices open to others. Generally, when 
more rather than fewer people want to purchase a good, that good can command 
a higher price than it otherwise could. Satz points to the development of a market 
in second homes to demonstrate what she has in mind: If more participants enter 
the market for a second home, then the demand for homes increases, and real 
estate prices rise. As a consequence, those who could have afforded a first home, 
had others bought just one, may no longer be able to. 59 
Similarly, if many people elect to sell a kidney in a given community, then this 
may impact the decisions open to those who would prefer not to. Satz notes, for 
example, "where kidneys are viewed as potential collateral, moneylenders may 
acquire incentives to seek out additional borrowers as well as to change the terms 
of loans."60 The worry here is that someone who did not want to sell or mortgage 
her kidney, may find it more difficult to secure a loan, or may be unable to get 
the same favorable rates she could have, were there no market. Those in this 
position may "have less effective choices insofar as they will no longer be able 
to find reasonable loan rates without mortgaging their organs."61 It appears then, 
that those who do not want to participate in the market are made worse off than 
they would be were there no market at all. 
At this point in her argument, Satz notes that what has been shown thus far 
does not undermine the case for a market in human kidneys any more than it 
undermines the case for a market in second homes. Costs of goods are affected 
by what buyers do in every market, and this, in itself, is no reason to prohibit 
commercial exchange. Rather, Satz suggests, "we need to ask: should people 
have to pay a cost for their unwillingness to sell their organs?"62 1t is not enough 
to show that one person's choices impact others. It must further be shown that 
the way in which other people's choices are altered is ethically objectionable. 
Satz suggests that there is reason to think that people should not be forced to pay 
a price for refusing to sell a kidney. She develops this thought by appealing to work 
done by Ronald Dworkin. In the work Satz references, Dworkin appears concerned 
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to determine the difference between a person and that person's circumstances. 
His theory of equality recommends equalizing resources, and so requires that this 
distinction be made clearly in order to determine fair distribution. There are many 
ways one might distinguish a person from her circumstances (and the resources 
they afford her), and each will recommend a different distribution of resources. 
This leads to difficult questions: "Would it be outrageous to require blood donations 
according to some fair lottery? Kidney donations? Eye donations?"63 
Dworkin's response to these troubling questions is to suggest that "we might 
well wish to resist this chain of questions by adopting a prophylactic line that 
comes close to making the body inviolate."64 I will refer to this as the Body 
Boundary Commitment (BBC). The BBC claims that people's body parts should 
not be subject to market forces. Dworkin supports the BBC on the basis of "the 
importance of protecting the person,"65 and Satz "concur[ s] that there is something 
to this line of thought."66 In a paper that served as an earlier version of the chapter 
in the book I've focused on here, Satz says, more specifically, that she approves 
of the BBC because "our relationship to our body parts is so closely bound up 
with our ability to control what happens to us, what we can be and do."67 
Thus, while the market for second homes limits the options available to others, 
this is a consequence of an unobjectionable expression of autonomy; pricing 
some first-time home buyers out of the market is not morally troublesome. But a 
kidney market is: as Satz notes, some non-donors "would have preferred loans be 
available at worse terms than those they could have if they were willing to put up 
their kidneys, but better terms than they will find in a world where kidney selling 
is legal and they do not wish to sell their kidneys."68 As the situation is described, 
body parts have become a consideration in commercial transactions, and non-
donors have been economically disadvantaged because of their unwillingness to 
part with their kidney. According to the BBC, however, the body should not be 
subject to market forces. So, the BBC rules out kidney markets. 
It is worth noting that Satz is not entirely persuaded of the BBC. She finds 
the above reasoning compelling, but worries that it "does not take into account 
the person who may be dying for lack of a kidney."69 One reason to doubt the 
legitimacy of the BBC, then, is that it fails to account for the interests of those 
who stand to benefit from a market. This is not an insignificant shortcoming. We 
may, along with Dworkin, want to protect the body from market forces. This is 
especially clear if we, and our loved ones, are well. But if we are among those 
in need of a transplant, or know someone who is, we may also want access to 
healthy kidneys. From this perspective, the BBC is far less appealing. 
But there is a reason to reject the BBC outright. In claiming an interest in 
preserving our "ability to control what happens to us, what we can be and do," 
Satz frames her view in language familiar to the capabilities approach introduced 
by Amartya Sen and developed by Martha Nussbaum.70 Satz also approvingly 
references Sen's view of entitlements as "the conditions that enable individuals 
KIDNEYS SAVE LIVES 85 
to mobilize the resources they have as a means to becoming full members of so-
ciety."71 But, I argue, if we are interested in preserving the substantive freedoms 
associated with the capabilities approach, then we ought to reject the BBC; it is 
ill-suited for promoting and protecting these values. 
The BBC is extensionally inadequate in two ways. First, it disallows some 
actions that seem fully consistent with our "ability to control what happens to 
us, what we can be and do." It, for example, precludes markets in solid organs, 
but also likely blocks sales of sperm, ova, blood, plasma, and surrogacy. All 
of these exchanges, when engaged in by a sufficiently large number of people, 
will lead to the same kind of effects that motivated the prohibition on a market 
in human kidneys. Many of these practices are already common, and some are 
generally regarded as ethically unproblematic, for example, selling plasma. While 
I think a prohibition on the seemingly innocuous practice of selling plasma is 
counter-intuitive, and unsupported by concerns about capabilities, this failure of 
extensionality is not what is most worrisome about the BBC. 
The problem I want to highlight is what the BBC permits. The BBC is fully 
consistent with our willingness to pay people to do dangerous work, some of 
which is clearly more risky than having a kidney removed, and clearly a greater 
threat to our "ability to control what happens to us and what we can do and be." 
Our best data suggests that 3 in 10,000 kidney transplants will result in death.72 
This stands in sharp contrast to the annual expected 11.6 deaths per 10,000 fisher-
men and the 9.2 deaths per 10,000 loggers.73 Further, in 2011, the median annual 
wage for a logger was $33,760. So, while a vendor, if Matas and Schnitzler's 
previously cited estimates are correct, might be offered a compensation package 
worth $100,000 or more, a logger, working an entire year, faces three times as 
much risk and is paid about one-third as much. I appreciate Dworkin's and Satz's 
desire to identify impermissible market encroachments, but I doubt that the BBC 
can serve that purpose. For it is entirely unclear why, if commercial fishing is 
consistent with the BBC, selling one's kidney in a well-regulated market is not. 
Further, the choice of some individuals to take these dangerous jobs may 
impact the choices others face. When a coal mine opens in a community, or log-
ging jobs become available, members of that community who are unwilling to 
take up that risky work may suffer a disadvantage in much the same way those 
who are unwilling to sell a kidney might. A loan applicant with a reliable job at 
the local mine will be preferred to the applicant with lower-paying, less stable 
employment at the cafe. Accepting these dangerous jobs can have the same 
pecuniary externalities that Satz worried would come about if large numbers of 
people within a community choose to sell their spare kidneys. 
Insofar as the BBC was motivated by a concern for "the importance of per-
sons,"74 and a desire to preserve our "ability to control what happens to us, 
what we can be and do," this formulation seems wrong. The trouble is not just 
that the BBC blocks seemingly innocuous commercial transactions, but that it 
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simultaneously permits others that are far more worrisome. A principle designed 
to delineate the limits of market forces should not deliver such counter-intuitive 
and seemingly inconsistent results. 
Satz's claim-that markets can adversely affect even those who do not par-
ticipate in them-is a welcome and insightful contribution to the debate over 
kidney markets. And we should be attentive to the ways in which markets impact 
our lives and the lives of those around us in unexpected ways. However, Satz is 
unable to show that a kidney market would result in a distinctive harm; the BBC 
is an inadequate means of limiting market forces, and so cannot serve to justify 
a prohibition. 
6. CONCLUSION 
My aim in the preceding has been to respond to three distinctive objections to 
the value of life argument. What these lines of resistance had in common is that 
each sought to show that a market, in principle, would be unacceptable. Against 
Caplan, I argued that a kidney market need not violate the "Do No Harm" principle. 
And in response to Titmuss-inspired worries about the crowding out of altruistic 
donors, I showed that we have ample reason to think that a market will, on bal-
ance, increase the supply of transplantable organs. Finally, I showed that Satz's 
concerns about non-pa1ticipants being unduly disadvantaged by the market were 
inadequate to justify a market prohibition. 
Refuting these objections was an important first step to developing and imple-
menting a market solution to the shortage of transplantable kidneys. But, having 
shown that these challenges fail to undermine the case for a market is insufficient 
to show that a market should be established. We must now turn out attention to 
the "real-world" objections, for the viability of the market hinges on our ability to 
adequately address these worries. While some of these objections may be assess-
able with reflection on the limited evidence we already have, others, I suspect, will 
only be decided after experimentation with actual markets. And this is one benefit 
of refuting the ideal conditions objections: The remaining disputes are, largely, 
sensitive to empirical data. And the prospect of small-scale trails is a bit brighter. 
Finally, to determine how serious the real-world objections are, much work must 
be done to determine the optimal design of a market. I have already suggested 
that a single-buyer market is most promising.75 I suspect this carefully regulated 
approach will best protect both vendors and recipients. Further, the composition 
and size of the compensation packages must be determined as well. Now, it is to 
these matters that market proponents should turn their attention. 
Vanderbilt University 
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ing a Kidney." 
23. Goyal et al., "Economic and Health Consequences." 
24. Delmonico et al., "Ethical Incentives." 
25. Danovitch and Leichtman, "Kidney Vending." 
26. Scheper-Hughes, "Tyranny of the Gift." 
27. Plant, "Is It Desirable?" 
28. Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, 73-80; "Black Markets." 
29. Goodwin, Black Markets; "Private Ordering and Intimate Spaces." 
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